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Abstract
This paper analyzes convex congestion network problems. It is
shown that for network problems with convex congestion costs, an
algorithm based on a shortest path algorithm, can be used to ﬁnd
an optimal network for any coalition. Furthermore an easy way of
determining if a given network is optimal is provided.
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11 Introduction
Economic congestions situations arise if a group of agents uses facilities from
a common pool and costs of using a certain facility depends on the number of
its users. A congestion problem creates interaction and involves the analysis
of a cost allocation problem.
Rather surprisingly, in cooperative game theoretic literature congestion
eﬀects have not been considered for a large extend. One branch of coopera-
tive literature especially suited by its very nature to accommodate consider-
ations regarding congestion is the literature on Operations Research Games
as surveyed by Borm, Hamers, and Hendrickx (2001). Quant, Borm, and
Reijnierse (2003) consider a particular extension of a minimum cost spanning
tree problem. In this extension costs of a network depend on the number of
users of the various parts. These problems are so called congestion network
problems. The problems of cost allocation and network structure are studied
for various cost functions with the aid of cooperative game theory. If cost
functions are convex, the underlying game turns out to be balanced. In the
case of concave cost functions, they show the existence of optimal network
structures without cycles and provide an example in which the correspond-
ing game has an empty core. This paper will focus on convex congestion
network problems, ie. cost functions of the parts of a network are convex.
The aim of this paper is to solve the problem of ﬁnding an optimal network
for a speciﬁc coalition.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we formally intro-
duce convex congestion network problems. In Section 3 the issue of ﬁnding
an optimal network for a coalition is solved. To solve this problem it is
ﬁrst illustrated how it can be determined if a network is optimal for a coali-
tion. Finally the algorithm of ﬁnding an optimal network is illustrated by
an example.
2 Convex congestion network problems
A convex congestion network problem is a triple T = (N;¤;(ka)a2AN¤),
where N = f1;:::;ng is a set of agents/players (so jNj = n), ¤ is the source
and N¤ := N [f¤g. The set AN¤ denotes the set of all arcs between pairs of
elements in N¤, i.e. (N;AN¤) denotes the complete digraph on N¤. For each
arc a 2 AN¤ the function ka : f0;:::;ng ! R+ is a nonnegative (weakly)
increasing convex cost function which depends on the number of users of a.
2A cost function ka, a 2 AN¤, is convex if for all m 2 f1;:::;ng:
ka(m + 1) ¡ k(m) ¸ ka(m) ¡ ka(m ¡ 1):
We assume that for all a 2 AN¤ it holds that ka(0) = 0. Elements of AN¤
will be denoted by a or by (i;j), where i;j 2 N¤. The arc (i;j) denotes the
connection between i and j in the direction from i to j. Node i is called
the tail of (i;j) and node j the head of (i;j). If a = (i;j), a¡1 denotes the
arc in opposite direction, ie. a¡1 = (j;i). The cost function of arc (i;j) is
denoted by kij. The problem is called symmetric if kij(m) = kji(m) for all
m · n and all (i;j) 2 AN¤.
A network can be described by f : AN¤ ! f0;1;2;:::g. Let F be
the set consisting of all such networks. A network f assigns to each arc
a number of users. The indegree for a network f 2 F and i 2 N¤ is






. Similarly the outdegree is






. The set of arcs used by f,
i.e. fa 2 AN¤ j f(a) > 0g, is denoted by Af.
For a coalition S 2 2Nnf;g, FS is the set of all networks such that all
members of S have a path to the source:
FS =
©
f 2 F j outdegree(i) ¡ indegree(i) = 1 for all i 2 S;
outdegree(i) = indegree(i) = 0 for all j 2 NnS;
f(a) 2 f0;:::;jSjg; 8a 2 AN¤
ª
:









The aim of S is to construct a feasible network such that total costs are
minimized.
A transferable utility cost game consists of a pair (N;c), in which N =
f1;:::;ng is a set of players and c : 2N ! R is a function assigning to
each coalition S 2 2N a cost of c(S). By deﬁnition c(;) = 0. With each
congestion network problem T = (N;¤;(ka)a2AN¤) one can associate a con-
gestion network game (N;cT), such that cT(S) denotes the minimum costs




Quant, Borm, and Reijnierse (2003) study congestion network problems
with arbitrary cost functions. It is shown that if cost functions are concave,
3the set of optimal networks contains trees. Furthermore if cost functions are
convex, the corresponding cooperative congestion network game has a non-
empty core. This paper focusses on convex congestion network problems, in
particular the problem of ﬁnding an optimal network.
Example 2.1 Consider a symmetric convex congestion network problem,
in which there are three players. For the arcs, the costs of one, two and







The corresponding TU-game cT is given below.
S 1 2 3 12 13 23 N
cT(S) 6 1 3 7 9 4 9





















Figure 1: Optimal network of the problem given in Example 2.1.
It is not directly clear how the optimal network of Example 2.1 can
be found, nor that this indeed is an optimal network. In the sequel we
concentrate on determining if a network is optimal and how one can ﬁnd
such an optimal network. Example 2.1 will be revisited at several instances.
43 Finding an optimal network
In this section we consider convex congestion network problems and solve
the problem of ﬁnding an optimal network.
First we derive a special condition for a network being optimal for a
certain coalition. This condition is based on ﬁnding a negative circuit
with respect to a length function determined by the network. Let T =
(N;¤;(ka)a2AN¤) be a convex congestion network problem and f 2 FN. We
assume that network f satisﬁes that f(a¡1) = 0 whenever f(a) > 0 for
a 2 AN¤, since if both f(a) and f(a¡1) are positive, the network remains
feasible if both f(a) and f(a¡1) are decreased by one. Because this new
network is as least as cheap as f, it is reasonable to make the above as-
sumption. Furthermore, we assume that Af does not contain any circuit,
since the network arising from f by decreasing the number of users of the
arcs in one circuit of Af by one yields a network as least as cheap as f.






1 if f(a) ¸ n (so f(a¡1) = 0),
ka(f(a) + 1) ¡ ka(f(a)) if f(a¡1) = 0 and f(a) < n,
ka¡1(f(a¡1) ¡ 1) ¡ ka¡1(f(a¡1)) if f(a¡1) > 0.
This function can be interpreted as the marginal costs of an extra user of
an arc. Note that if the opposite a¡1 of an arc is used, an extra user of arc
a should be interpreted as the reduction of the number of users of a¡1 by
one. The following lemma proves that if f is not optimal for N, then AN¤
contains a negative circuit1 with respect to the length function lf.
Before stating this lemma, we ﬁrst show the reverse: an optimal network
does not contain a negative circuit with respect to its length function. Con-
sider an optimal network f. Suppose that AN¤ contains a negative circuit
C with respect to lf. Then f(a) < n for all a in C. One can change f by
increasing the numbers of users of the arcs of C by one. If an arc of C is
used in opposite direction, it is meant that the number of users of the oppo-
site arc is decreased by one. This yields a new network, which is feasible as
well, since the number of users of arcs are nonnegative and does not exceed






. Since C is a
negative circuit, this contradicts the optimality of f.
1A set of arcs C is called a circuit if the arcs in C form a sequence  
(i1;i2);(i2;i3);:::;(ip;i1)

such that all (intermediate) nodes involved diﬀer. A circuit
C is a negative circuit with respect to a length function l if
P
a2C l(a) < 0.
5Lemma 3.1 Let T = (N;¤;(ka)a2AN¤) be a convex congestion network
problem. Let f 2 FN. If f is not optimal, then AN¤ contains a negative
circuit with respect to the length function lf.
Proof: Let f 2 FN and suppose that f is not optimal for N. Let ¯ f be
an optimal network for N. By comparing f and ¯ f we will ﬁnd a negative
circuit with respect to lf.
Deﬁne the network ¯ f ª f that measures the diﬀerence between ¯ f and f
as follows:
¯ f ª f(a) = maxf ¯ f(a) ¡ f(a) + f(a¡1) ¡ ¯ f(a¡1);0g:
It assigns a positive number of users to an arc a 2 AN¤, if the arc is used
more in ¯ f than in f or/and if the arc in opposite direction is used more in
f than in ¯ f. Since both ¯ f and f are feasible for N, and ¯ f ªf measures the
diﬀerence between ¯ f and f, it holds for all i 2 N that:
indegree
¯ fªf(i) ¡ outdegree
¯ fªf(i) = 0:
This implies that A ¯ fªf contains a circuit C. We will show that it contains
a negative circuit with respect to lf.
Let a be an element of C. In the following table the ﬁve possibilities of
the presence of a and a¡1 in A ¯ f and Af are illustrated. An arrow to the
right indicates the presence of a, an arrow to the left the presence of a¡1,
whereas x indicates that neither a nor a¡1 are present.
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5
A ¯ f ¡! ¡! ¡! x Ã¡
Af ¡! x Ã¡ Ã¡ Ã¡
For example, the arrows in the last column indicate that 0 < ¯ f(a¡1) <
f(a¡1), since a 2 A ¯ fªf and in both networks a is used in opposite direction.
Note that there is no column with a left arrow in the row of A ¯ f and a right
arrow in the row of Af, since then a¡1 and not a were present in C. For the
same reason, the column with a left arrow and a x and there is no column
with a x and a right arrow. The set C can be partitioned into ﬁve sets
C1;:::;C5, each corresponding to a column of the table above.
Let C¡1 be the circuit C in opposite direction, then:
X
a¡12C¡1











ka¡1( ¯ f(a¡1) + 1) ¡ ka¡1( ¯ f(a¡1))
¢
¸ 0: (1)
6Inequality (1) is true, because ¯ f is optimal. Assume for the time being that









































Here the ﬁrst inequality follows from the convexity of the functions ka and
the fact that ¯ f(a) ¸ f(a) + 1 if a 2 C1 [ C2 and f(a¡1) ¸ ¯ f(a¡1) + 1 if
a 2 C4[C5. Consequently C is a negative circuit with respect to the length
function lf.
In the case inequality (1) is tight, so
P
a¡12C¡1 l ¯ f(a¡1) = 0, one can
change the network ¯ f as follows: increase the numbers of users of the arcs
of C¡1 by one. If an arc of C¡1 is used in opposite direction in ¯ f (so
a¡1 2 C¡1 and ¯ f(a) > 0), it is meant that the number of users of the
opposite arc is decreased by one. The resulting network ¯ f1 is feasible and
costs k( ¯ f)+
P
a¡12C¡1 l ¯ f(a¡1) = k( ¯ f) and is also optimal, since ¯ f is optimal.
One can measure the diﬀerence between f and ¯ f1 in a similar way as the
diﬀerence between f and ¯ f. In comparison to ¯ f ªf it holds that for all arcs
a in AN¤, ¯ f1 ªf(a) = ¯ f ªf(a) if a is not in C and ¯ f1 ªf(a) = ¯ f ªf(a)¡1
if a is in C. The set of edges A ¯ f1ªf also contains a circuit and one can
follow the lines of the proof above. If inequality (1) is again tight, one must
deﬁne networks ¯ f2, ¯ f3 and ¯ f2 ªf, ¯ f3 ªf and so on, until a strict inequality
arises. Eventually, this will be the case, since the values of ¯ fk ª f(a) are
decreasing for all a 2 AN¤. Note that ¯ fk ªf is the zero network if and only
if f(a) = ¯ fk(a) for all a 2 AN¤. Because f is not optimal, ¯ fk ª f cannot be
the zero-network; there is a k for which inequality (1) is strict. ¤
Combining Lemma 3.1 with the remark that if a network f is optimal,
7then AN¤ does not contain a negative circuit with respect to lf, yields the
following theorem.
Theorem 3.1 Let T = (N;¤;(ka)a2AN¤) be a convex congestion network
problem. Then f 2 FN is optimal if and only if AN¤ contains no negative
circuit with respect to the length function lf.
The existence of negative circuits can be detected by a shortest path2
algorithm, as e.g. is described in Floyd-Warshall algorithm (Papadimitriou
and Steiglitz (1982), page 132). If the algorithm ﬁnds that the ’shortest
path’ (cheapest way) to go from some node to itself has negative costs,
there must be a negative circuit containing this node.
Example 3.1 In this example it is shown that the network f depicted in
Figure 1 is indeed optimal for N. According to Theorem 3.1 it is suﬃcient
to show that there is no negative circuit with respect to lf. In ﬁgure 2
the complete digraph with length function lf is drawn. The Floyd-Warshall
algorithm ﬁnds the following matrix of shortest paths: 2
6 6
4
0 -6 -3 -5
6 0 3 1
4 -2 0 -1




There is no negative circuit, since there are only zeroes on the diagonal.
Theorem 3.1 provides the tools to introduce an algorithm which deter-
mines an optimal network for each convex congestion network problem. The
algorithm described below is based on the following idea. First an order is
chosen on N. An order of N is a bijective function ¾ : f1;:::;ng ! N. The
player at position i in the order ¾ is denoted by ¾(i). The set of all orders
of N is denoted by Π(N). Players are connected to the source in this order
in an optimal way. It is allowed to use all arcs to establish a connection
to the source. The ﬁrst player, ¾(1); chooses a shortest path to the source,
this results in a network. The second player faces this network and chooses
a shortest path to the source. The costs of this path depend on the path
chosen by the ﬁrst player. If player two uses an arc that is also used by the
ﬁrst player, it costs the marginal costs from one to two users. If player two
uses an arc that is used by the ﬁrst player in opposite direction, this cancels
2A set of arcs P is called a path from i to j if the arcs in P form a sequence  
(i;i2);(i2;i3);:::;(ip;j)

, such that all nodes involved diﬀer, except possibly i and j



































































Figure 2: Digraph (N;AN¤) with length function lf.
out. In general: using an arc in the same direction yields the marginal costs
of a player extra and using an arc in opposite direction yields a beneﬁt of
the marginal costs of one user less. Hence if a player chooses a shortest path
to the root he faces the length function of the current network. One can
continue until all players are connected. We ﬁrst give a small example to
illustrate the idea of the algorithm.
Example 3.2 Consider a symmetric convex congestion network problem




Suppose that player 1 is the ﬁrst one to be connected to the source. The




. The resulting net-
work is the left picture of Figure 3. For player 2 there are two possible paths




. This costs 3, since (2;¤) is also





1 is using (2;1) in the opposite direction, this cancels the use of (1;2) and
yields a beneﬁt of 3. The resulting costs are ¡3 + 5 = 2. Hence it is better
for player 2 to choose the indirect path. In fact by choosing this path, he
changes the path of player 1. The resulting (optimal) network for the two
players is depicted in the right sided network of Figure 3.
Before giving a formal deﬁnition of the algorithm, we provide some ad-






























Figure 3: Optimal networks for player 1 (left) and coalition f1;2g (right) of




1 if a 2 P,
0 if a 62 P.
Let f1 and f2 be two networks, then the sum f1 © f2 is deﬁned by:
f1 © f2(a) := maxff1(a) + f2(a) ¡ f1(a¡1) ¡ f2(a¡1);0g
for all a 2 AN¤. This operation takes into account that the usage of two
oppositely directed arcs cannot be beneﬁcial. If there is two ways traﬃc
between nodes, the numbers of users are subtracted instead of added.
The above described procedure can be described in the following way.
At some moment a network is chosen by a group of players. The next player
chooses a shortest path with respect to the length function of the network
present at that moment. The combination of the network and the chosen
path leads to a new network. This new network can be found by adding the
network which corresponds to the path and the original network using the
operation ©.
Algorithm 3.1
Input: a convex congestion network problem T = (N;¤;(ka)a2AN¤) and an
order ¾ 2 Π(N).
Output: an optimal network fn 2 FN.
1. Initialize f0(a) = 0 for all a 2 AN¤ and t = 1.
2. Find a shortest path Pt in (N;AN¤) from ¾(t) to ¤ with respect to the
length function lft¡1.
3. Set ft(a) = ft¡1 © fPt.
104. If t 6= n, set t := t + 1 and return to step 2.
Finding shortest paths can be done again by the Floyd-Warshall algo-
rithm. In its purest form, it ﬁnds only the values of all shortest paths, but
ﬁnding the paths themselves is just a matter of keeping track which arcs
optimal paths use. It has a complexity of order O(n3). Since we have to
perform it n times, the complete algorithm has a complexity of order O(n4).
The following theorem states that this algorithm yields an optimal net-
work for N.
Theorem 3.2 Let T = (N;¤;(ka)a2AN¤) be a convex congestion network
problem and ¾ 2 Π(N) an order. The output fn of Algorithm 3.1 is an
optimal network for coalition N.
Before giving the proof of Theorem 3.2, we ﬁrst take a closer look at
the speciﬁc characteristics of the algorithm. In each step an extra node is
connected to the source and for this node it is allowed to use all arcs. This
diﬀers from our approach that a coalition can only use arcs for which both
head and tail correspond to members of that coalition. In fact this gives rise
to a relaxation in which all arcs are fully public. The set of feasible networks
for a coalition S µ N becomes:
ˆ FS =
©
f 2 F j outdegree(i) ¡ indegree(i) = 1 for all i 2 S;
outdegree(i) ¡ indegree(i) = 0 for all j 2 NnS;
f(a) 2 f0;:::;jSjg; 8a 2 AN¤
ª
:
The aim of a coalition S is to connect all its members to the source, such that
total costs are minimized. Denote the corresponding coalitional value by
ˆ cT(S). Note that ˆ cT(N) = cT(N). We then have the following generalization
of Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.3 Let T = (N;¤;(ka)a2AN¤) be a convex congestion network
problem. Then f 2 ˆ FS is optimal (i.e. ˆ cT(S) = k(f)) if and only if (N;AN¤)
does not contain a negative circuit with respect to lf.
The proof of this theorem follows exactly the lines of the proof of Lemma
3.1 and is therefore omitted. We can now give the proof of Theorem 3.2.
Proof of Theorem 3.2: Assume without loss of generality that ¾ is the
identity. It is easy to see that fn is feasible for N, since at step t the net
11degree (which equals the diﬀerence between outdegree and indegree) of ¤
decreases from t ¡ 1 to t, the net degree of the nodes 1;:::;t ¡ 1 remains
1, the net degree of node t increases from 0 to 1 and the net degree of the
nodes t + 1;:::;n remains 0. In the end, all nodes but the root have net
degree one, hence fn is feasible. To prove the optimality of fn an induction
argument is used. It is suﬃcient to prove that for all t 2 f1;:::;ng, the
network ft is optimal for the coalition f1;:::;tg in the relaxed game, i.e.
ˆ c(f1;:::;tg) = k(ft).
If t = 1, then lft¡1(a) = ka(1) ¸ 0 for all a 2 AN¤. P1 is the shortest
path from 1 to ¤ and trivially ˆ c(f1g) = k(f1).
Let t 2 f1;:::;n¡1g. Assume that the network ft is optimal for coalition
f1;:::;tg. There exists a shortest path P := Pt+1 from player t + 1 to ¤
with respect to lft. We have to prove that ft+1 is an optimal network
for coalition f1;:::;t + 1g. According to Theorem 3.1 this can be done by
showing that there is no negative circuit with respect to lft+1. This is proved
is by contradiction.
Suppose that C is a negative circuit with respect to lft+1. The following
argument shows that with the help of C and P a network feasible for coalition
f1;:::;tg can be found, that costs less than ft, which yields a contradiction.
Note that ft+1 = ft © fPt+1. Let ˆ f be the network arising from ft+1 if
one user walks along the circuit C. Then ˆ f = ft+1 © fC and can also be





2 if a is used by both P and C,
1 if a¡1 is neither used by P nor C and a is either used by
P or C,
0 otherwise.
The net degree outdegreeh(i)¡indegreeh(i) of node i is 1 if i equals t + 1,
¡1 if i is the root and 0 otherwise. It follows that there is a path ¯ P ½ Ah
from t + 1 to ¤. Notice that if arc a is used by the path and its opposite
a¡1 by the circuit (or conversely), then h(a) = h(a¡1) = 0. Therefore ¯ P
is not necessarily the same path as P. Decompose network h into three
0,1-networks f ¯ P, h1 and h2 such that h(a) = f ¯ P(a) + h1(a) + h2(a) (note
that here a regular operation + is used) for all a 2 AN¤, h1 + h2 is a
circulation network.3 After path ¯ P has been chosen, h1 and h2 are deﬁned
3A circulation network is a network in which all nodes have net degree zero.
12by (a 2 AN¤):
h1(a) :=
½




1 if h(a) ¡ f ¯ P(a) = 2,
0 otherwise.
The costs to obtain network ˆ f from network ft can be computed in two
ways:














lft©f ¯ P(a) +
X
a2Ah2
lft©f ¯ P©h1(a): (3)
Since P is the shortest path from t + 1 to ¤ it holds that
P
a2P lft(a) · P
a2 ¯ P lft(a). From the fact that C is a negative circuit with respect to lft+1
and equations (2) and (3) we can conclude that:
X
a2Ah1
lft©f ¯ P(a) +
X
a2Ah2
lft©f ¯ P©h1(a) < 0: (4)
It is shown below that for each arc a 2 Ah1 it holds that lft(a) · lft©f ¯ P(a).
Let a be an arc in Ah1 (so h(a) > f ¯ P(a)). Then a¡1 is not used by
¯ P, since h(a) > 0 implies that h(a¡1) = 0. If a is neither in ¯ P, then
lft(a) = lft©f ¯ P(a). If a is used by ¯ P, we show that lft©f ¯ P(a) exceeds lft(a).
We distinguish between three cases. First if ft(a) > 0 (this implies that
ft(a¡1) = 0), then:
lft©f ¯ P(a) = ka(ft(a) + 2) ¡ ka(ft(a) + 1)
¸ ka(ft(a) + 1) ¡ ka(ft(a))
= lft(a):
The inequality follows from the convexity of the function ka.
Secondly if ft(a) = 0 and ft(a¡1) = 1, it is true that:
lft©f ¯ P(a) = ka(1) ¡ ka(0)
¸ 0
¸ ka¡1(0) ¡ ka¡1(1)
= lft(a):
13Finally if ft(a) = 0 and ft(a¡1) > 1, it holds that:
lft©f ¯ P(a) = ka¡1(ft(a¡1) ¡ 2) ¡ ka¡1(ft(a¡1) ¡ 1)
¸ ka¡1(ft(a¡1) ¡ 1) ¡ ka¡1(ft(a¡1))
= lft(a):
The inequality follows from the convexity of the function ka¡1.
Because ¯ P \ Ah2 = ;, we have for all a in Ah2:
lft©f ¯ P©h1(a) = lft©h1(a):
We conclude that:















On the other hand, because h1 + h2 is a circulation network, the network
ft©(h1+h2) is feasible for the coalition f1;:::;tg. Inequality (5) contradicts
the assumption that ft is an optimal network. ¤
In the following example Algorithm 3.1 is used to determine an optimal
structure of the convex congestion network problem of Example 2.1.
Example 3.3 Consider the congestion network problem of Example 2.1. A
number near an arc denotes its length. Choose ¾ as the identity. Then ﬁrst





. The resulting network f1 is depicted next to
the digraph.





. Since player 2 uses arc (2;3) in the opposite
direction of player 1 this cancels out. Hence in f2 the arcs (2;3) and (3;2)
are both not used.
Finally player 3 searches for a shortest path with respect to lf2, this is





network f3 is also depicted in Figure 6. According to Theorem 3.2 this





































































































































































































































































Figure 6: Left: digraph (N;AN¤) with length function lf2 and right: network
f3.
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